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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WEI-~DON R. REEDER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORA-
TION, a corporation 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case 
No. 8601 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We feel that a restatement of the facts is necessary 
to enable this Court to understand the issues presented 
on this appeal. The statement given by appellant is so 
incomplete and unrelated to sequence of events that it 
is difficult to follow and connect. 
The action is for alleged conversion of a 1955 Buick 
automobile, which plaintiff claimed to own, in the pos-
session of defendant, and which it is alleged defendant 
refused to deliver to him ( R. 1). 
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Defendant denied that plaintiff O\vned the car and 
that it \vas guilty of converting the same (R. 2). 
Plaintiff's evidence showed that Valley Motor Com-
pany was a Buick dealer at Logan, under a written con-
tract introduced in evidence by plaintiff (Ex. "A") 
(R 12), \vhich provided that the dealer should pay in 
cash for each shipment of cars (see par. 3 thereof); that 
the dealer is not the agent or legal representative of 
seller (see par. 29) ; and that the dealer is solely respon-
sible for all commitments to customers and that seller 
shall not be held responsible for any commitments of the 
dealer unless it assumes such responsibility in \Vriting 
(see par. 30). 
On January 3, 1955 plaintiff entered into an agree-
ment with Valley ~Iotor Company to buy a new car (Ex. 
''B'') (R 12). Valley Motor Company sent to defendant 
an order for the car (Ex. '' B '') to be delivered to 
plaintiff at Flint, Michigan, on January 20, 1955, upon 
authorization from Valley ~Iotor Company. 
Valley Motor Company never paid for the car 1n 
cash, pursuant to contract, nor did it do so by use of the 
rredit facilities of General Motors Acceptance Corpora-
tion (R. 50); nor did plaintiff take delivery of the car 
on ,January 20, 1955, or at any other time (R. 20). 
On January 18, 1955, defendant delivered to General 
Motors Acceptance Corporation a bill of sale covering 
the car (Ex. "C' ') for completion of finanring by Valley 
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~Iotor Company, at which time a trust receipt and prom-
issory note were prepared by G.M.A.C. and held in its 
files until Jan nary 31, 1955, when they were returned to 
defendant (Ex. "E "). Exhibit "C" reads as follows: 
''To General Motors Acceptance Corporation 
(hereinafter referred to as G.M.A.C.): 
The undersigned dealer, hereinafter referred 
to as the trustee, hereby accepts delivery and pos-
session of the above described property under the 
conditions and for the purposes herein expressed: 
1. Title to said property remains in G.M.A.C. 
as security retained for and until the trust-
ee's payment in cash of the amount of his 
(its, their) promissory note of same identi-
fication number. 
2. Said property is in the possession of the 
trustee hereunder at his (its, their) sole risk 
of all loss or injury for the purpose of stor-
ing and exhibiting same preliminary to and 
in procuring the sale thereof. 
3. The trustee agrees to keep said property 
free of all taxes, liens, and encumbrances, to 
keep said property brand-new and subject 
to inspection and not to use or operate same 
for demonstration or otherwise without ex-
press permission except as may be necessary 
to drive same from freight depot or from 
receiving city to trustee's place of business, 
at trustee's risk en route, against all loss and 
damage to said property, persons or other 
property; not to sell, loan, pledge, mortgage, 
or otherwise dispose of said property until 
payment of said amount and not to use said 
property illegally, improperly or for hire. 
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4. In the event of trustee's default in payment 
under and according to said promissory note 
or not complying \vith the terms and condi-
tions hereof, and in the event of trustee's 
bankruptcy, insolvency or receivership, or 
G. l\L A. C. deems itself insecure or said 
property or any part thereof in danger of 
misuse, loss, seizure or confiscation G.M.A.C. 
may take immediate possession of said prop-
erty without demand or legal process, and 
for this purpose may enter upon the prem-
ises wherever said property may be and re-
move same. Thereupon G.M.A.C. may, at 
its election either (a) sell said property 
upon notice at public or private sale for the 
trustee's account, or (b) declare the transac-
tion and the trustee's obligation under said 
promissory note to be terminated and can-
celled and retain any sums of money paid 
by the trustee as a deposit on delivery here-
under. Recorded on the 'date of execution' 
specified above.'' 
Plaintiff never had title to the car (R. 28); never had 
possession of the car (R. 28); never paid defendant the 
purchase price of the car; and never had a.ny contractual 
relationship with defendant relating to acquisition of 
title to the car (R. 27 -28). 
Valley Motor Company neYer had title to the car 
(Ex. 1) ; never had actual possession of the car; and had 
no eontract \vith defendant for acquisition of title except-
i ug for cash (Ex. 1). General I\Iotors .. A .. cceptance Corpora-
tion held title until January 31, 1955, and \Yas not to con-
,~p~r title to 'Talley until the car "~as paid for (Ex. "C"), 
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which was never done. Plaintiff offered no evidence that 
either defendant or G. l\1. A. C. was ever paid for the car. 
In the meantime, Valley Motor Company lost its 
credit standing and the trust receipt and the title papers 
were returned to defendant (R. 50-51). See Ex. "E." 
Plaintiff testified that on January 25, 1955, he called 
defendant's office in Michigan and talked to some uniden-
tified individual who advised him that his car was there 
and had been since January 20th (R. 36); that on the 
24th day of January, 1955, plaintiff was advised not to 
go to Flint for the car (R. 45), but nevertheless on Jan-
uary 27, 1955, he went to defendant's plant in Michigan, 
talked to a Mr. Burkhart and was advised that the car 
was not there; it had been reshipped (R. 26). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IN 
DENYING PLAINTIFF RECOVERY FOR CONVER-
SION WAS CORRECT, BECAUSE: 
(a) PLAINTIFF DID NOT SHOW TITLE TO 
CAR· 
' 
(b) PLAINTIFF DID NOT SHOW ANY CON-
TRACTUAL OBLIG.A.TION ON THE PART 
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(c) PI~.AINTIFF DID NOT SHOW ANY CON-
DUCT ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT 
WHICH WOULD ESTOP IT FROM DENY-
ING TITLE TO THE CAR TO BE IN 
PLAINTIFF. 
ARGUMENT 
The judgment of the trial court in denying plaintiff 
recovery for conversion was correct, because: 
(a) Plaintiff did not sho"\\7 title to the car; 
(b) Plaintiff did not show any contractual obliga-
tion on the part of defendant to deliver title to 
plaintiff; and 
(c) Plaintiff did not sho'v any conduct on the part 
of defendant which 'vould stop it from denying 
title to the car to be in plaintiff. 
This is an action for c'onversion based upon plain-
tiff's alleged ownership of the car. Where right to pos-
session is based upon ownership and title, plaintiff must 
prove that fact. The rule is well stated in cases from this 
Court: 
Mads en v. lJf adse1r, 269 Pac. 132, 72 Utah 96, as 
follows: 
''A conversion of personal property is de-
fined as an unauthorized assumption and exercise 
of the right of ownership over goods or personal 
chattels of another to the alteration of their con-
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clition or the exclusion of the owner's rights, and 
'trover' is the technical name of the common-law 
action provided for the redress thereof ( 38 Cyc. 
2005), and the measure of damages for conversion 
when property is not returned is the value of the 
property at the time of the conversion, plus 
interest.'' 
Johnson v. Flo~vers, 228 Pae. 2d 406, 119 Utah 425: 
''The general rule is announced in 53 Am. 
J ur., Trover and Conversion, p. 863-4, Sec. 68, a.s 
follows: 'The general rule is that an action for 
conversion is not maintainable unless the plaintiff, 
at the time of the alleged conversion, is entitled to 
the immediate possession of the property. An in-
terest in the property which does not carry with it 
a right to possession is not sufficient; the right to 
maintain the action may not be based upon a right 
to possession at a future time.' '' 
Larsen v. Knight, 233 Pac. 2d 365, 120 Utah 261: 
" 'The general rule is that an action for con-
version is not maintainable unless the plaintiff, 
at the time of the alleged conversion, is entitled 
to the immediate possession of the property.' 53 
Am. J. 863; Johnson v. Flo~vers, Utah, 228 P. 2d 
406. '' 
Christensen v. Pugh, 36 Pac. 2d 100, 84 Utah 440: 
''Conversion is any unauthorized act of do-
minion or ownership exercised by one person over 
the personal property of another in denial of his 
right in the property, or inconsistent with it. 
Cooley on Torts (4th Ed.) Sec. 331. The most fre-
quently quoted definition is that in 2 Greenleaf on 
Evd., Sec. 642: 'Conversion consists either in the 
appropriation of a thing to the party's own use 
and beneficial enjoyment, or in its destruction, or 
in exercising dominion over it, in exclusion or de-
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fiance of the ottvner's right, or in withholding the 
possession of the property from the owner under 
a claim of title inconsistent 'lvith his own.' Under 
all the authorities where transfer of possession 
was had by the owner's consent, even though un-
der misrepresentation as to the purpose for the 
transfer, until some act is done by the bailee which 
is a denial, or violation, or disregard, of the 
ottV111cr' s rights in the property, conversion will not 
lie. The gist of conversion is not the acquisition of 
property by a wrongdoer, but the wrongful depri-
vation of it to the owner.'' 
See also Lee Woodttvorking Company v. Hub Plat-
ing Works, 217 Fed. 2d 453: 
"It is fundamental that the plaintiff would 
be required to prove title to the property and the 
right to immediate possession before it could 
recover in trover. Nettleton v. Kerr, 167 Ill. App. 
7 4; Ridge v. Giffrow, 220 Ill. App. 590." 
Since this is the general rule \Ye shall cite no fur-
ther cases. 
Plaintiff, by his own evidence, showed title and right 
to possession in General I\lotors Corporation, defendant, 
under the terms of Exhibit 1 until it was paid in cash for 
the car. 
He also proved by his evidence, assuming the trans-
action with General Motors Acceptance Corporation to 
have been completed, "Thich it \Yas not because the papers 
\vere still in the hands of G.l\1 .... '-\.C., that title to the car 
and right of possession "Tt:"~re in G.J\I .... \.C. until the car 
was paid for. Neither title or possession, or the right 
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to title, passed from defendant and G.M.A.C. according 
to plaintiff's own evidence. 
Since neither General Motors or G.M.A.C. was ever 
paid for the car by either Valley or plaintiff, there the 
matter of title and right to possession rests so far as 
this case is concerned, according to the written docu-
ments presented by plaintiff himself. 
Plaintiff seeks to overcome this obvious defect in 
his case by two arguments : 
1. That he was told by some unidentified telephone 
operator over long distance phone on January 25, 
1956, that his car was ready for him; and 
2. That the Valley 1Iotor Company, by reason of 
the trust receipt (Ex. C) became trustee of the 
title for plaintiff; and that since plaintiff had 
theretofore made a contract with Valley for pur-
chase of the car, plaintiff had the right as third 
party beneficiary to title and possession as 
against General Motors and G.M.A.C., notwith-
standing the wording of the contract papers. 




A telephone conversation with some unidentified tele-
phone operator was insufficient to divest defendant or 
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G.~1 . .i\...C. of title to the car as established by the '''"ritten 
contract documents introduced in evidence by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff seems to place great weight upon this alleged 
conversation. In the absence of any showing as to the 
identity and authority of this telephone operator, this is 
completely answered by the case of Utah Foundry & Ma-
chine Company v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 131 Pac. 1173, 
42 Utah 533. In that case plaintiff brought action for 
moneys due for iron castings sold to defendant. Defend-
ant counterclaimed for conversion. One Wright was 
agent for defendant and allegedly unlawfully sold iron to 
one Croft. This Court laid down the following rule as to 
the authority of an agent as follows : 
''There is the evidence of Croft, Sr.'s admission 
that he received iron from Wright; that he paid 
him for it; and that he presumed Wright had paid 
it to the defendant. 
* * * :1: 
' 'The admission of Croft, Sr., was not a binding 
admission of the plaintiff. He was the secretary of 
the plaintiff corporation, and its bookkeeper, and 
collector. The rule is u'ell settled that, to bind the 
principal with an admission. of his agent, the decla-
ra.tion or statement of the agent 1nust have been 
made ttoithin the scope of his employment and dur-
ing the transaction of business by him for the 
tJrincipal and in relation to such bu,siness; that is, 
the declaration or statement of the agent must be 
contemporaneous "'"ith or in the course of the 
business or transaction and in relation thereto 
conducted by the agent for the principal within 
the scope of the agency. The declarations or state-
ments of the agent here 'Yere not made under any 
such circumstance. They were made long after the 
transactions with respect to "'"hich they were de-
10 
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clared had "rholly ended, long after the business 
had been conducted, and were not made in the 
course of nor in relation to any business which the 
agent 'vas then transacting or conducting for the 
principal. Certainly, an agent not in the course 
or transaction of any business for his principal, 
may not on the public mart or elsewhere make 
binding admissions of fact against his principal 
by a mere narration of facts relating to transac-
tions wholly ended and long past. Property rights 
of the principal cannot be bartered away in any 
such manner as that." (Italics supplied) 
The written contract, Sec. 35, Ex. 1, expressly pre-
cluded the authority of anyone to alter the contract by 
oral commitment, and certainly an unidentified telephone 
operator could not do it. 
2. 
TRUST RECEIPT ACT AND SALES ACT 
Plaintiff seeks by some type of legal gymnastics to 
write his name as beneficiary of the trust receipt written 
up by G.M.A.C., held in its files, never delivered to Valley, 
and subsequently returned to defendant. He would de-
lete the entire wording of the document itself which ex-
plessly states on its face, if it were supposed that it had 
become a valid document, that title toas to remain in 
G.M . .A.C. until it was paid for the car by Valley, and 
expressly negatived the right of Valley to sell or convey 
the car. Valley was not trustee of the title, a,s arguer/ by 
plaintiff. G.M.A.C. held title. Valley was to haue ha.d 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
only a qualified and limited right of possession, which it 
n.ever took. 
By what legal sophistry can a court be urged to write 
into a document something that is not there, and delete 
from a document what is expressly written into it' This 
Court has many times held in no uncertain terms that 
the function of a court is to interpret written documents, 
not to rewrite the contract to suit litigants. It is not nec-
essary to cite cases on a proposition as fundamental as 
this. 
In the first place, the Trust Receipts Act of either 
Utah or Michigan has no place in this case. The trustee 
(Valley) was never given title to be held in trust. If 
plaintiff felt that he had some case under the Michigan 
law, by reason of this trust receipt (Ex. C), it would 
have to be an action against G.M.A.C. for violation of 
the trust document. He would have to allege and prove 
the Michigan law, and then prove some obligation on 
the part of G.M.A.C. to deliver title to plaintiff in spite 
of and notwithstanding the express "\Yording of the trust 
receipt to the contrary. The Utah Trust Receipts Act has 
no place in the case "Thatsoever. That part of the trans-
action took place in Michigan and the documents never 
left the possession of G.M.A.C. in ~Iichigan. The ex-
press wording of the statute under the definition of trust-
ee is that the trustee is one "Tho has possession of prop-
erty or documents under a trust receipt. Valley never had 
actual possession or title. 
12 
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The purpose of the Trust Receipts Act, if it had 
anything to do with this case, is to permit the ware-
housing of merchandise, with title retaining features, 
'vithout compliance \vith the recording statutes of the 
State where the \varehousing is to be done. Nowhere does 
the Trust Receipts Act invalidate the terms and pro-
visions of the trust documents, and this is particularly 
true where the title and possession are retained by the 
en trustor. 
Sec. 9-2-1, UCA, 1'953, expressly states that it applies 
only to a sale by the trustee for new vaZ.ue, where the 
goods are sold and delivered for nezc value, or where the 
delivery is made on a pre-existing contract for cash or on 
credit. 
Plaintiff's purchase contract with Valley was on Jan-
nary 3, 1955, at which time he turned in his old car to 
Valley. This was fifteen days before the date of the trust 
receipt. There is no evidence that he thereafter gave any 
new value to either Valley or defendant G.M.A.C. 
Plaintiff never had delivery of the car from anyone. 
Counsel's argument that delivery of the car by defend-
ant to its own Customer Drive-Away department consti-
tuted delivery to plaintiff is so fantastic and so unrealis-
tic as to require no answer. 
The purpose of Sec. 9-2-1 of the Trust Receipts Act, 
if it were applicable, is to create an estoppel against the 
entrustor (in this case it would be G.M.A.C.) in favor of 
a subsequent purchaser who parts with n.ew value and 
13 
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who takes deli1:ery from a trustee in possession of the 
property, or a prior purchaser who subsequently parts 
with new value by "\\ray of cash or credit and who takes 
delivery from a trustee in possession. Plaintiff does not 
fit into this picture by any stretch of the imagination. 
Whatever of value he parted with was on January 3, 
1955, and the contract that he signed was on the same 
date, fifteen days prior to the date of the trust receipt, 
and plaintiff never at any time parted with any value to 
Valley after the date of the trust receipt; and the alleged 
trustee never had possession, which is the very basis of 
applicability of the Trust Receipts Act. 
The same general principles are set forth in our 
Sales Act (Sec. 60-2-7, UCA 1953) which reads as follows: 
''Sale by a person not the owner.-(1) Sub-
ject to the provisions of this title, where goods are 
sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and 
who does not sell them under the authority or with 
the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no 
better title to the goods than the seller had, unless 
the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded 
from denying the seller's authority to sell. 
"(2) Nothing in this title, however, shall 
effect: 
'' (a) The provisions of any factors' acts, re-
cording acts, or any enactment enabling the appar-
ent owner of goods to dispose of them as if he 
were the true owner thereof. 
''(b) The validity of any contract to sell or sale 
under any special common la-w· or statutory power 
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See also ~'Jchwartz v. lVhite, 13 Pac. 2d 643, and 
Tho·Jnas Y. Farrell, 26 Pac. 2d 328. Both are Utah cases. 
The various elements to constitute an estoppel in all 
of its phases has been clearly set forth in the Utah case 
of Barber v. Anderson, 274 P. 136: 
" 'In conformity with the principle already 
stated 'vhich lies at the basis of the doctrine, and 
upon the authority of decisions "rhich have recog-
nized and adopted that principle, the following 
are the essential elements which enter into and 
form a part of an equitable estoppel in all of its 
phases and applications. One caution, however, is 
necessary and very important. It would be unsafe 
and misleading to rely on these general requisites 
as applicable to every case, 'vithout examining the 
instances in which they have been modified or 
limited. 1. There must be a conduct - acts, lan-
guage, or silence - amounting to a representation 
or a concealment of material facts. 2. These facts 
must be known to the party estopped at the time 
of his said conduct, or at least the circumstances 
must be such that knowledge of them is necessarily 
imputed to him. 3. The truth concerning these 
facts must be unknown to the other party claiming 
the benefit of the estopel, at the time when such 
conduct was done, a.nd at the time when it wa.s 
acted upon by him. 4. The conduct must be done 
with the intention, or at least with the expectation, 
that it will be acted upon by the other party, or 
under such circumstances that it is both natural 
and probable that it will be so acted upon. There 
are several familiar species in which it is simply 
impossible to ascribe any intention or even expec-
tation to the party estopped that his conduct will 
be acted upon by the one who afterwards claims 
the benefit of the estoppel. 5. The conduct must 
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be. relied upon by the other party, and, thus rely-
ing, he must be led to act upon it. 6. He must in 
fact act upon it in such a manner as to cha;nge his 
position for the u,orse; in other words, he must so 
act that he would suffer a loss if he were compelled 
to surrender or forego or alter what he has done 
by reason of the first party being permitted to 
repudiate his conduct and to assert rights incon-
sistent with it.' " 
Also, see Utah cases of Cook v. Cook? 174 Pac. 2d 434, 
and Cache Valley General Hospital v. Cache County, 67 
Pac. 2d 639. There is no estoppel where one party has 
not conducted himself so that another acts in reliance on 
his conduct. 
The elements of estoppel in the case at bar are con-
spicuous only by their entire absence. At the time plain-
tiff made his agreement with Valley Motor and at the 
time he parted with his property there was no conduct 
or representation upon the part of the defendant. None 
is contended. Wherein did plaintiff change his position 
for the worse by reason of any conduct on the part of 
defendant~ The record clearly and beyond any doubts 
refutes all such ideas. Quite the contrary, at the earliest 
opportunity the defendant advised the plaintiff not to 
a Iter or change his position. 
There seems to be no doubt that the sales contract 
between the plaintiff and Valley ~Iotor 'Yas breached by 
the VaHey Motor and plaintiff undoubtedly believes that 
they are no longer responsible. Of this fact 'Ye haYe no 
knowledge. We do kno"T that in this action the plaintiff 
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is grasping at straws in order to recoup his loss. We 
know of no action that may be based on such a notion. 
Plaintiff refers to V ailey as defendant's authorized 
dealer and implies that there is some agency relationship 
between defendant and Valley. The contract expressly 
says to the contrary. And these contracts have uniformly 
been upheld by the courts. Without extensive quotations, 
we cite the following authorities : 
Whi.tson et al v. Pacific Nash Motor Co., 215 Pac. 846. 
S. B. McMaster, ln.c. v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 3 Fed. 
2d 469. 
Hudson v. Gulf Oil Co., 2 S. E. 2d 26. 
Ford v. Willys-Overlwnd, Inc., 147 S. E. 82~ 
Anheuser-Busch v. Manion, 100 S. W. 2d 672. 
Detroit Motor Appliwnce Co. v. Ta.ylor, 4 F. Supp. 
2d 520. 
Brown v. Cleveland Tractor Co., 251 N. W. 557. 
Piper v. Oakland Motor Company, 109 A. 911. 
Watson et al v. Oregon Moline Plow Co., 193 Pac. 222. 
Gibbs v. Plymouth Motor Co.,. 166 S. E. 74. 
Silverman v. Samuel Mallinger Co., 100 A. (2d) 715. 
State v. W. T. Rawleigh Co., 174 S. E. 385. 
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We respectfully submit that the trial court was cor-
rect in directing a verdict for defendant. Plaintiff's evi-
dence failed to show any title in plaintiff; failed to show 
any right to possession as against defendant; and on the 
contrary showed title in the property in defendant and 
G. M. A. C., not plaintiff; and he failed to show any 
estoppel against tlefendant under any existing or applic-
able law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH, ELTON & MANGUM 
Attorneys for Defendamt 
307 Utah Oil Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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